Abstract -This paper is an extension to earlier studies
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Department of Energy (DOE) requested an assessment of the attractiveness, from an international safeguards and national physical protection perspective, of the special nuclear materials (SNM) (i.e., Pu, 233U, and 235U), alternate nuclear materials (ANM) (i.e., 237Np and Am), and other actinides that have a critical mass (e.g ., Cm) that are associated with reprocessing and are handled in forms largely decontaminated of fission products. Each potential malefactor is unique in the material to which he has access and in the degree of sophistication he could utilize in weaponizing the material. Collectively, proliferant states and sub-national groups could consider a broad spectrum of SNM and ANM to be attractive for use in an explosive nuclear device. This paper delineates a set of figures of merit (FOM) that are intended to explain the attractiveness or preferences for a range of nuclear materials across a span of credible nuclear adversaries.
A credible nuclear threat from a sub-national group is different than that from a proliferant state. On the one hand, the perceived threat from a sub-national group i, more dependent upon the fact that a device may produce any nuclear yield than it is upon the actual amount of yield. Even in a low technology, low quality device, any nuclear yield will, in most cases, vastly exceed the conventional explosive yield. Thus, any device capable of generating a nuclear yield in the hands of a sub-national group would meet their requirements. On the other hand, a proliferant state is likely to have a preference for materials that are more easily and efficiently fabricated into higher yield nuclear weapons than those materials of interest to a subnational group. All SNM and ANM should be protected and safeguarded according to the highest level of attractiveness derived from both of these threats.
The point at which the nuclear explosive energy exceeds the conventional explosive energy is the point at which there is a potentia] nuclear threat. This point is also known as a threshold nuclear yield. The primary factors of material attractiveness are the bare critical mass, the internal heat generation, and the radiation dose rate. 4 The spontaneous neutron generation rate, another aspect of material attractiveness, is relevant to cases where militarily significant nuclear yields are desired,5 but the proliferant state is only capable of building less sophisticated devices.
The need to carefully and rigorously distinguish between the proliferation of nuclear weapons or explosive devices by a nation state, and the use of nuclear material by a subnational terrorist group to produce a nuclear explosive device is explicitly acknowledged in the growing volume of literature on assessing proliferation and physical security risks. Two major international efforts to develop methodologies to assess proliferation resistance -the Generation IV International Forum Working Group on Proliferation Resistance 6 and the lAEA's INPRO activity7 -distinguish proliferation resistance from physical protection, based on the identity of the actors:
• Proliferation resistance is that characteristic of a nuclear energy system (NES) that impedes the di version or undeclared production of nuclear material or misuse of technology by the Host State seeking to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
• Physical protection (robustness) is that characteristic of an NES that impedes the theft of materials suitable for nuclear explosives or radiation dispersal devices (RDDs) and the sabotage of facilities and transportation by subllational entities and other nonHost State adversaries.
This distinction, and limiting the use of the term proliferation resistance to describing nation-state proliferation impacts, has been nearly lost in today's lexicon. Statements that characterize the physical protection impacts of a particular NES are often incorrectly associated with the term proliferation resistance. This misuse of terms conveys a misleading message with respect to the potential proliferation risks or benefits associated with a particular NES. Material attractiveness is one of several considerations when e valuating either proliferation resistance or robustness of a nuclear energy system. This paper will focus on answering four questions that are increasingly being posed of advanced fuel cycles: I) Is reactor-grade (RG) plutonium attractive for use in a nuclear explosive device, and at what point does increasing the ratio of 238pU to other plutonium i otopes make the plutonium unattractive for use in a nuclear weapon or a nuclear explosive device? 2) Do advanced reprocessing approaches [for light-water-reactor (L WR) spent fuel] that produce grouped products in which plutonium i separated with one or more minor actinides render the product unattractive for use in a nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device without further chemical separation? 3) At what point might diluting plutonium or a transuranic mixture render the mixture as unattractive for use in a nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device? and 4) Do other advanced fue l cycles (e.g.. thorium based cycles) produce products that are potentially attractive for use in a nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device? Related and no less important, does the answer to any or all of these four questions depend upon whether the proliferator is a nation state or a sub-national group?
II. METHODOLOGY
The first metric presented lsee Eq. (1) ] is applicable for evaluating the attractiveness of SNM or ANM for a sub-national group, for most of the less advanced pro Ii fe ran t nations, or for a technically advanced proliferant state. The latter would be capable of building nuclear devices that assemble very rapidly to limit the impact of pre-initiation. 5 For a sub-national group any nuclear yield is acceptable so pre-initiation is not a significant issue. Such cases are evaluated using the following formula:
where M is the bare critical mass of the metal in kg, h is the heat content in Wlkg, and D is the dose rate of O.2·M
e valuated at 1 m from the surface in radlh. The dose term in Eq. (1) has been modified with the insertion of a multiplicative factor, MJ50, relative to the form that appears in Refs. 1 and 2 , because lower quality, larger bare-critical-mass material requires an increased penalty for high dose due to increased handling requirements. For a very few relatively unadvanced proliferant nations that desire a reliably high yield. pre-initiation is an issue. The material attractiveness for such a nuclear device must necessarily be reduced for materials with a high spontaneous neutron generation rate. Then, the second variant of the FOM is given by:
800 + 4500 + 6.8(10)6
where S is the spontaneous-fission neutron production rate in nJs/kg. In a more specific evaluation using Eqs. (1) and (2) Historically, the self-pr lecting dose rate was assumed to be 100 remlh at 1 m. 8 Upon recent technical review,9.lo it has been increased to 500 radlh at I m. The exponent in the dose tenn [i.e. , 11l0glO(2) = 3.322] is the result of a requirement to reduce the FOM by ].0 when the dose increases from 500 to 1,000 radlh.
~
The FOMswere reviewed by nuclear weapons experts at both LANL and LLNL. While it was determined that there are a number of smaller factors that are not captured, it was agreed that the FOM equations presented herein capture the dominant factors as well as possible in an unclassified format. Table I gives the meaning of the FOM. To make a material unattractive for use in a nuclear device, the FOM must be less than I. Note that Table I by itself does not distinguish, even in a qualitative sense, between degrees of proliferation resistance (e.g .• high, medium, low) that might characterize a nuclear material or a grouped product. Table  I reflects the fact that while a particular nuclear material might be preferable for use in a nuclear weapon or explosive device, the differences do not preclude the design and construction of effective nuclear weapons from any of the materials with a FOM of > 1. For example, plutonium from typical civil spent fuel could be used in a nuclear device. 8 As thi paper will show, plutonium with 239pU content ranging above 90% (often characterized as low proliferation resistance) or between 50% and 20% (often characterized as high proliferation resistance) both have a FOM > I. The fact that potential proliferanL states or subnational groups might "prefer" one material over another should not imply that either material in question is "proliferation-proof," or that any reduction in international safeguards and national physical protection requiremcnts can be justified. Likewi e, within a typical spent fuel pool and even along the length of a typical fuel assembly significant variation of burn-up exists. The isotopic composition of spent fuel was generated with ORIGEN2.i2 for bum-ups ranging from 7.5 to 90 MW·dJkg for the purposes of this ana1ysis. The calculations of the required 235U enrichment of the fuel charge and the spent fuel compositions are in good agreement with similar published results.
-
19 Also varied was the spent fuel age at the time of reprocessing relative to the time of discharge. A bum-up of 45 MW-dlkg was assumed to calculate the isotopic composition of the thorium spent fuel. The bum-up calculations were completed using the TRITON module of SCALE 5.1,20 and the decay after burn-up was modeled using ORIGEN-ARP?I The advantage of TRITON over ORIGEN is that non-slandard fuels can be used.
Ill. RESULTS Table II provides a list of the UREX products. Figure   1 provides results of FOM calculations using Eq. (J) for the non-uranium bearing products listed in Table n. Additionally, the FOM of weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu), high and low enriched uranium (HEU and LEU, respectively), 237Np, and 2.l3U contaminated with 10 ppm 232U are shown on the left side of each figure for reference. The UREX products with the highest FOM I (i.e. , most attractive) are Pu and Pu+Np, which have nearly the same FOM value. The FOM I of Pu and Pu+Np decreases significantly wilh increasing burn-up. because the concentrations of 239pU and 241pU (i.e., the isotopes with relatively high fission cross sections) decrease and the concentration of 238pu, which is an intense heat source, increases with increasing bum-up. The age of the spent fuel at the time of reprocessing has only a minor effect on the FOM (i.e. , the FOM increases slightly with increasing age)_ Heat is the primary proliferation barrier for Pu and Pu+Np.
The next hjghest FOM I value belongs to TRU. The FOM of TRU decreases significantly with increasing bumup, because the concentrations of 239pu and 241 Pu decrease with increasing bum-up. However, the FOM of TRU increases significantly with increasing spent-fuel age; because 242Cm and 244Cm, which arc intense heating sources, quickly decay away (their half lives are 163 days and 18 years, respectively).
In contrast, the FOM of Am increases with increasing burn-up, because of the build up of 243 Am relative to 241 Am as the bum-up increases and because 243 Am produces less heat relative to 241 Am. The FOM of Am decreases with increasing age, becau e of the build up in the spent fuel of 241 Am relative to 243 Am with increasing spent-fuel age due to the beta decay Of 241 pU to 241Am. Although FOM) of Cm is too low to appear in Fig. I , Cm s FOM also increases with increasing bum-up, because of the build up of 244Cm relative to 242Cm as the bum-up increases and because 244Cm produces less heat relative to 242Cm. As with TRU. the FOM of Cm increases significantly with increasing spent-fuel age. Although Cm has a significant neutron dose, the FOM is dominated by its heating. Interestingly, when not chemically separated the Am+Cm mixture has a maximum attractiveness of "low," independent of bum-up and age. Table I ). Included for reference are the following dala points: a -LEU (20%). b -HEU (93%), c -237Np. d -2:\3 U (10 ppm 232 U), and e -WG-Pu.
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The retention of the lanthanides (Ln) with TRU or Am+C m greatly reduces the FOM (the FOM 1 of Am+Cm+Ln is too low to appear in Fig. t) , because the lanthanide provide an intense photon dose and, more importantly, an intense heat source. The FOM of TRU+Ln decreases with increasing bum-up, because of the relative build-up of lanthanides with increasing burn-up. The FOM of TRV+Ln increases with increasing age, because the lanthanide hal f Ii ves are of the order of 100 years.
F igure 2 shows the effect of using different FOM formulae to calculate the attractiveness of the non-uranium bearing UREX products. The magnitude of the penalty incurred in Eq. (2) for spontaneous-fission neutron production relative to Eq. Figure 4 shows the effect of diluting Pu and TRU with uranium from the same spent flJet (i.e., < 1% 235U). The FOM ! is reduced with the addition of this uranium. However, significant quantities of uranium are required to attain a low attractiveness for use in nuclear weapons. For example, > 80% U is required for Pu, and -75% U is required for TRU, both obtained from 10-year old spent fuel burned to 45 MW ·dIkg. It should be noted that thi study focused only on the attractiveness of these uranium mixtures and did not consider any subsequent reprocessing or purification by an adversary. Several proposals for "denaturing" the plutonium isotopic vector have been made. 2 1.22 Figure 5 shows the results from Eqs. (1) and (2) for "denaturing" the plutonium isotopic vector. Depending on the burn-up, the plutonium in spent fuel has up to 8% 238PU. Adding additional 2J8 pU further reduces the attractiveness of the plutonium for use
Proceedings of Global 2009 Paris, France, September 6-11 , 2009 Paper 9543 in nuclear weapons. On the one hand, 80% 238pu is required to reduce the plutonium to "low" attractiveness using Eq.
(1). A sustainable source for that much 238pu has not yet been identified. On the other hand, very little additional 238pU is requ ired using Eq. (2). Only 8% 238pU is enough to drop to "low" attractiveness for the few cases of an unadvanced proliferant state that requires reliably high yield nuclear devices. The analysis of international safeguards and national physical protection issues for all plutonium spiking proposals should use Eq . (I) to evaluate material attractiveness. AMFP+REFP; and that arne ratio ranges from -% at 15-MW'dlkg spent fuel to 2.0 at 90-MW'dJkg pent fuel when the fission products used are REFP. As shown in Fig. 7 , the thorium fuel cycle produces two isotopes that are of concern from a safeguards per. pective: 233 U and 239pu . The 233 U is bred from thorium, and the 239pu is bred from any low enriched, natural, or depleted uranium that is introduced to dilute the 233U that is bred from the thorium. For the three cases analyzed herein, the 239pu is of greater concern from a safeguards perspective. However, burning thorium fuel produces smaller quantities of 239pu than burning uranium fuel. Diluting the 239pu wiLh spent thorium requires the mixture to be > -% Th to achieve low attractiveness using Eq. (1).
Diluting the 233 U with spent thorium requires the mixture to be > -YJ Th to achieve "low" attractiveness, depending on the initial quantity and quality of the Pu in the thorium charge. If LEU is mixed with the thorium fuel at charge, then there is sufficient 238U to mask the build up of 233U during its bum and to render the uranium unattractive at discharge.
Figure 7 also provides a gauge of the degradation in material atlractiveness that results from materials being 'burned" in a thorium-fueled reactor. The attractiveness of WG-Pu at charge is displayed as symbol "e" in Fig.7 ; whereas the attractiveness of that same plutonium at discharge and whatever plutonium is bred during bum corre ponds to the intersection of the line for Mat I with the y-axis. Hence, burning WG-Pu in a thorium-fueled reactor degrades the attractiveness by -004. Similarly, the attractiveness values for LEU and reactor-grade plutonium decrease by -0.5 and -0. 
IV. DISCUSSION
The most attractive UREX product is Pu+Np . The FOM of TRU, which is a UREX+la product, is dependent upon spent-fuel age and bum-up. Because the FOM of TRU increases significantly with spent-fuel age, if spent fuel is going LO be reproces ed, then proces ing should be done as soon as is practical. Furthermore, reprocess d TRU should be burned as soon as is practical, because the FOM of TRU increases significantly with increasing pOSlreprocessing time. 2 For IO-yr, 45-MW'dIkg UREX+la material (i.e., TRU), a U concentration> 75% is required to reduce the FOM I to "low" attractiveness.
The Pu+Np product has the same FOM as Pu product; co-extracting Np with Pu does not reduce its attractiveness for use in nuclear weapons. Conversely, extracting just Pu leaves Np in the waste stream. For 10-yr, 45 -MW·d/kg COEX material (i.e., Pu + U mixture), a U concentration of -80% is required to reduce the FOM to low attractiveness.
The FOM of Pu (and Pu + Np) is not significantly affected by changing the post-irradiation time or by changing the post-reprocessing time.
The FOM 1 of reactor-grade plutonium denatured with 238pu concentration < 80% is still at least "medium" atlractiveness. "Virtually any combination of plutonium isotopes can be used to make a nuclear explosive device (except> 80% 238pu).,,24 A device that uses reactor-grade plutonium could have a significant nuclear yield, regardless of the concentration of troublesome isotopes (i.e., 238pU and 24DpU).25 Relative to weapons-grade plutonium, reactofgrade plutonium does present some challenges, but these are not considered prohibitive. Radiation levels require more shielding and greater precautions to protect personnel when building and handling nuclear devices made from reactor-grade plutonium than nuclear devices made from weapons-grade plutonium? 5 While the heat generated by 238pU and the spontaneous-tission neutrons generared from 2:l8pU and 240pu require careful management in a nuclear device, there are well developed means for addressing these problems; they are not a significant hurdle to the production of nuclear explosives, even for developing states or sub national groupS.25 At the lowest level of sophistication, a potential proliferant state or sub-national group using designs and technologies no more ophisticated than those used in first-generation nuclear weapons could build a nuclear explosive from reactorgrade plutonium that could have a significant nuclear yield. 25 Theft of separated reactor-grade plutonium therefore poses a significant security risk. 5
The TRU-bearing electro-chemical reprocessing product displays the same characteristics as UREX TRU and TRU + Ln. For a nominal reactor discharge that has heen burned to 45 MW ·d/kg and then cooled for 10 years before reprocessing, the TRU from that discharge would require 2: 75% U for MFPlMTRU = O. Alternatively, the same
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TRU with 0% U would require M~TRU > o. I 5 when the fission products used are AMFP+REFP, but M~TRU > 0.38 when the fission product. used are REFP. The thorium fuel cycle produces two potentially atlractive materials: 239pU and 233U. The Pu is of greater concern from a safeguards perspective. The Pu product can be rendered unatlractive by making a Pu-Th mixture that is > ¥l Th during/after reprocessing. The 233U product can be rendered unattractive by adding natural or depleted U to the fuel before irradiation, but may exacerbate the 239pU problem in the product. Additionally, the 2J3U product can be rendered unattractive by making a U-Th mixture that is > I;3 Th during/after reprocessing.
The addition of a new figure of merit has provided significant insight into material attractiveness. The addition of a penalty term associated with , pontaneous-fission neutron production in Eq. (2) reveals that only LEU, HEU, 237Np, and 233U are impervious to its effects. Furthermore, the application of the effects of spontaneous-fission neutrons to all potential nuclear weapons designs may be the source of the misconception by some that reactor-grade plutonium is not attractive for weapons use. It should be noted that any material with a critical mass requires some level of safeguards and security protection consistent with international guidelines regardless of its FOM.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In the introduction, four qUl!stions were raised that are increasingly being posed of advanced fuel cycles. Those four questions and their corresponding answers are given below: In general, dilution with 238U, 23~h, or even another inert material increases the bare critical mass and thus reduces the attractiveness of the material. With greater than 80% 238U or 70% 232Th (perhaps less with other materials) the material is "low" attractiveness. Except for dilution of 233 U and 235 U with 238U, the material can still be made attractive by purification, but this takes time and some degree of technical capability.
The presence of about 8% 23SpU reduces the attractiveness to "medium" except for an unadvanced proliferant state where it reduces the attractiveness to "low." For an advanced proliferant state or a sub-national group, 80% 238pU is required to reduce the attractiveness to "low." Spontaneous-fission neutron production rate is only significantly relevant to an unadvanced proliferant state. In this case, reactor-grade plutonium is "low" attractiveness. For an advanced prolifcrant state or a sub-national group. reactor-grade plutonium is still "high" attractiveness for low bum-ups and "medium" attractiveness for high bumups. The analysis of safeguards and physical protection issues should use Eq. (I) to evaluate material attractiveness for all materials. For the most part, dose rate is inconsequential in these analyses. Dose rale will be more important in future analyses that look at dose rates from specific spent fuel assemblies. There are safeguards and security benefits to dilution with inert materials and the addition of high heat content or in some cases high spontaneous-fission neutron rate materials. However, we have not identified a "silver bullet" technology that would eliminate safeguards and security issues. None of the proposed flowsheets examined to date justify reducing international safeguards or physical security protection levels. All of the reprocessing or recycling technologies evaluated to date still need rigorous safeguards and high levels of physical protection.
